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In the debate about the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the EU’s institutional balance, an-
tagonists have often argued past each other. Supporters of the new intergovernmentalism 
contend that the European Council has supplanted the European Commission in policy lead-
ership, while scholars who hold that the EU executive has been a winner of the crisis high-
light the new management functions it has acquired. This article argues, first, that an accu-
rate assessment of the institutional balance requires a more global evaluation of the Commis-
sion, acknowledging external and internal dynamics. Second, it contends that the Eurozone 
crisis did not cause a Commission retreat. Rather, the crisis accelerated a process already 
underway that finds its origins in a different dynamic: the presidentialization of policy control 
undertaken by Commission President Barroso. The adoption of fewer legislative proposals by 
the Commission during the crisis was due to the ability and choice of a strong president to 
focus the attention of the institution on crisis-related areas of policy, not the displacement of 
the institution by the European Council. The broader lesson is that rather than marking a 
further step in the decline of the Commission, the crisis reveals how the centralization of 
power within the institution and its expanded management duties have enhanced its capacity 
to take strategic action. The Commission’s role as an engine of integration will therefore en-
dure, but in a different guise. 
 
Keywords: European Commission, Economic Governance, Eurozone Crisis, New Intergov-
ernmentalism 
 
Introduction 
At the very moment the Lisbon Treaty entered into force – and thereby brought a decade of 
constitutional debate in the European Union (EU) to an end – the Eurozone crisis put the new 
institutional balance to the test. Widely viewed as one of Lisbon’s losers, the Commission 
immediately faced a critical moment that questioned its institutional role (Laffan 2016). The 
EU’s handling of the crisis raised serious questions about the Commission’s role in economic 
governance and EU policy-making in general. 
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 Although the debate about the Commission’s influence over EU policy is as old as 
European integration itself (e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1965), the focus over the last two dec-
ades has been on its apparent decline, challenged by the growing role of the European Coun-
cil, the empowerment of the European Parliament, and the creation of new regulatory agen-
cies (e.g., Kassim and Menon 2010; Kassim et al. 2013: 131-135). More recently, this argu-
ment has been extended by advocates of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’ who emphasize the 
proliferation of decision-making processes beyond the Community method, the reluctance of 
member states to delegate further competences to the ‘traditional’ supranational institutions, 
and the emergence of the European Council as the central actor in EU policy-making (Bicker-
ton et al. 2015a). The new intergovernmentalism seeks to ‘recast’ the role of the Commission 
and the Court of Justice ‘in a new mould’, arguing that these institutions are now ‘more cir-
cumspect about the pursuit of ever closer union’ (Bickerton et al. 2015b: 39). In the era of 
new intergovernmentalism, which began with the Maastricht Treaty, they are ‘are no longer 
the “engines of integration” that they once were’ (Bickerton et al. 2015a: 717). Authors writ-
ing from this perspective about the crisis depict the Commission as the ‘little engine that 
wouldn’t’ (Hodson 2013). More modestly, Peterson (2015: 207) argues that, despite the trend 
towards an intergovernmentalist dynamic, the Commission ‘mostly gets on with its work’, 
which mainly ‘is focused on closer European policy cooperation’. It might even represent ‘an 
oasis of calm within the storm’ in the disequilibrium that is the current EU. Becker and Bauer 
(2014), by contrast, have challenged the view that the Commission’s role has been diminished 
as a result of the crisis and contend, to the contrary, that the Commission emerged stronger 
with important new managerial tasks in economic governance. 
This article argues that the impact of the crisis on the Commission is considerably 
more complex than is suggested by the current debate and contests key elements of the new 
intergovernmentalist approach. First, any assessment of the effects of the crisis on the Com-
mission in the institutional balance needs to look beyond either policy-making as highlighted 
by the new intergovernmentalism or management responsibilities. A more global examina-
tion, acknowledging external and internal dynamics, is necessary. The Commission’s role as 
an engine of integration that seeks to provide leadership and impetus for EU policy-making, 
its own traditional interpretation of its mandate to ‘promote the general interest of the Union’ 
(Art. 17 TEU), needs to be reconsidered. Entrepreneurship, i.e., aiming “to induce authorita-
tive political decisions that would not otherwise occur”, by the Commission has long been 
based on ‘favoring more ambitious schemes for further institutional and substantive integra-
tion’ (Moravcsik 1999, 271). It is now more subtle and versatile.  
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Second, although the number of proposals adopted by the Commission – and, corre-
spondingly, the volume of EU legislation – did fall when the Eurozone crisis broke in 2010, 
the crisis was a catalyst rather than a cause of the decline in legislative proposals. The crisis 
did not initiate the change, but altered the speed of a process of change that had already been 
underway for a number of years. Moreover, contrary to claims that the Commission had re-
treated or been eclipsed by the European Council, analysis shows that far from abandoning 
the field, the Commission concentrated its attention on aspects of economic governance and 
provided leadership in areas that pertained directly to the Eurozone crisis.  
Third, the explanation for a reduction of the Commission’s policy activism is to be 
found in an intra-organizational process rather than the inter-institutional dynamic highlighted 
by the new intergovernmentalism. The downward trend in the Commission’s decisional out-
puts was the result of concerted action on the part of its eleventh President, José Manuel Bar-
roso, to strengthen presidential control over the Commission’s policy activism, especially 
during his second term, not displacement of the Commission by the European Council. In-
deed, the crisis accelerated the process of presidentialization that had begun during Barroso’s 
first term. Both Barroso after 2010 and Jean-Claude Juncker, his successor, have used the 
enhanced powers and resources available to the office to take personal control over the Com-
mission agenda and to end the expansionist policy activism that historically characterised the 
organization. As a result, a new model of Commission intervention has emerged – top-down 
managed, measured, restrained, and strategic – that contrasts with the unprogrammatic and 
piecemeal approach of the past. 
Drawing on new empirical evidence – two large-scale surveys in the Commission,1 in-
terviews with high-level officials, and legislative data from EUR-Lex – to support these con-
tentions, the article proposes a new interpretation of the impact of the crisis on the Commis-
sion and a new assessment of the organization’s post-crisis position. It contends that the 
Commission may face increased constraints, but its capacity to legislate, even in controversial 
areas such as economic governance, is still important. Moreover, its expanded management 
duties mean new opportunities to provide impetus for EU policy-making. Finally, the emer-
gence of presidentialized leadership has equipped the Commission with a new strategic abil-
ity, enabling it to act more programmatically and with greater focus than previously.  
 
The Commission on the Eve of the Crisis 
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In order to assess the changes in the role of the Commission during the crisis, it is essential to 
revisit the point of departure. The Commission had already undergone several transformations 
by the time the Eurozone crisis unfolded in 2010. This section reviews its condition before the 
crisis, at the end of 2009, to provide a benchmark against which to assess subsequent change. 
 
Institutional and Political Environment 
The Commission has historically been an embattled institution (see e.g. Lindberg 1965). Since 
the early 1990s, however, it had come under particular pressure. Successive treaty changes – 
Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice – had encroached upon the Commission’s institutional posi-
tion by strengthening the European Parliament, limiting the Commission’s power in new EU 
competences, and delegating regulatory tasks to other executive bodies (Kassim and Menon 
2004). Shortly before the crisis, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty furthered under-
mined further its centrality. First, although the European Council already played an influential 
role in setting the EU’s political agenda, the formalization of its position was of practical and 
symbolic significance. The wording of Article 15 (1) TEU, namely, that the European Council 
‘shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the 
general political directions’, overlaps with the Commission’s mission to promote the Union’s 
general interest. As well as acknowledging the European Council’s long-standing leadership 
role, the Lisbon Treaty established a full-time presidency. This strengthened the European 
Council’s capacity by enabling it to develop more focused working methods (Puetter 2012). It 
has thus become an even stronger challenger for the Commission in setting the agenda and 
formulating answers to strategic problems. Second, the Lisbon Treaty further empowered the 
European Parliament by the expansion of co-decision. Although the Commission kept its sole 
right of initiative in most policy areas and remained the crucial actor for policy formulation,2 
its role of delivering policy proposals grew more complex due to an additional veto player and 
a more heterogeneous set of preferences. This made Commission policy entrepreneurship in 
the classic sense – i.e., formulating and pushing for hard law in the Community method – 
more difficult.  
In addition to the Lisbon reforms, the political environment of the pre-crisis years also 
affected the Commission. Although European integration was never acclaimed by ordinary 
citizens, European elites were relatively unrestricted when negotiating EU matters. This ‘per-
missive consensus’ had all but vanished; political actors now operated under a ‘constraining 
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dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 5). European integration was heavily politicized and 
closely scrutinized (for a recent account, see Hutter and Grande 2014). Blame games and gen-
eral complaints about ‘Brussels’ being too powerful and interventionist were common. Posi-
tive views on EU membership among its citizens frequently dipped below the 50 per cent lev-
el since Maastricht; and although public opinion fluctuates, such dips had not happened be-
fore (for an overview, see Commission 2014a). This growing hostility effectively limited the 
Commission’s ability to propose bold integration proposals, and even modest initiatives often 
attracted negative responses. Furthermore, enlargement made policy entrepreneurship for the 
Commission more complicated; by now, it had to accommodate the preferences of 28 member 
states when developing policy proposals. At the same time, its responsibilities as the guardian 
of the treaties had expanded in scale, scope and complexity. As a consequence, the Commis-
sion’s task portfolio had shifted towards management (Bauer 2006; Laffan 1997; Metcalfe 
1992; Kassim and Menon 2004, 2010). Finally, some policy fields were by now almost satu-
rated; the main legislative work had been done. The governance of the single market had, for 
instance, broadly moved from development to management (see also Pelkmans 2016). In gen-
eral, the Commission was now more concerned with implementation, better regulation and 
improving the quality of existing legislation than promulgating new laws. The combined ef-
fect of the institutional and political environment for the Commission was thus a stronger fo-
cus on management rather than policy entrepreneurship. 
 
Internal Organization 
The presidentialization of the Commission was also a key factor in the pre-crisis years. Start-
ing from a low base (Campbell 1983: 181), the Commission presidency has become increas-
ingly powerful since the 1990s and especially since 2004 (Kassim 2012; Kassim et al. 2016). 
Acutely aware of growing Euroscepticism, wariness if not hostility about intervention from 
‘Brussels’ on the part of national capitals, and seeking to combat the perception of the Com-
mission as a remote bureaucracy driven by a relentless desire to regulate ‘every matter under 
the sun’, Barroso used the constitutional powers available to the office to strengthen the 
Commission Presidency as a means to control policy activism within the institution. He be-
lieved that the Commission could only succeed if it concentrated on issues where the EU 
could demonstrably add value, showed greater sensitivity to member governments, and made 
more use of options other than ‘hard’ law (Kurpas et al. 2008). Strengthening the Commission 
Presidency, he used the enhanced resources of the office to promote a more discriminate, dis-
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ciplined and measured approach to policy, established quality control systems, and imple-
mented a better regulation agenda. He also took personal charge of certain policy areas, as 
well as putting his name to key initiatives. 
Historically, the Commission had been a fragmented institution, where power was 
widely dispersed within the College and between the services (Coombes 1970; Kassim et al. 
2013: chs 6, 7). In the absence of a central capacity to orchestrate or promote a coherent or 
unified programme, individual Commissioners and policy Directorates General had consider-
able autonomy to pursue their own policy agenda. Since the 1990s and especially since 2004, 
however, the powers of the Commission Presidency have been significantly enhanced. Not 
only is the policy leadership of the Commission President now unchallenged, but the incum-
bent has been able to bring policy activism within the Commission under control. Strong pres-
identialism is no longer an exception that is based on personal qualities, such as in the case of 
Delors, but underpinned by formal organization.   
This presidentialization can be explained in terms of three main factors. The first is the 
differentiation of the Commission President from other members of the College. Beginning 
with the Treaty of European Union, which provided for a separate selection procedure for the 
Commission President, successive treaties have steadily strengthened the incumbent’s person-
al mandate. In terms of policy leadership, the primacy of the Commission President was first 
established by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Successive treaties also granted the Commission 
President powers to appoint other Commissioners, decide on their portfolios, and to dismiss 
them.  
Second, new administrative capacities, established within the Secretariat General as 
part of the Kinnock reforms that were enacted under the Prodi Commission in response to the 
crisis that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission, were an important step in develop-
ing an administrative platform at the centre of the institution enabling policy coordination and 
oversight. The most important was Strategic Planning and Programming (SPP), a system of 
priority-setting and resource allocation. The introduction of impact assessment procedures 
was also significant. 
Political entrepreneurship on the part of Barroso is a third factor. Barroso mobilized 
the formal powers granted by the treaties both to reaffirm the pre-eminence of the Commis-
sion Presidency and to extend the procedural and administrative resources of the office, with 
the aim of establishing detailed presidential control over the College and the wider organiza-
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tion (Kassim et a.l 2016, Kurpas et al. 2008). His transformation of the Secretariat General, 
historically, the guardian of collegiality and the representative of the Commission administra-
tion to the political level, into a personal service of the Commission Presidency was a key 
element. Since the Secretariat General is the Commission’s central coordinating body and 
process manager, its conversion dramatically extended the Commission President’s reach into 
the administration and grip over policy. Moreover, since the Secretariat General was the locus 
of SPP, the Commission President gained important control over policy coordination and in-
ternal gatekeeping.  
Survey responses and data from interviews with Commissioners, cabinet members and 
managers as part of ‘The European Commission in Question’, carried out in 2008 and 2009 at 
the end of Barroso I (and reported in Kassim et al. 2013: 6) testify both to the increased power 
of the Commission President and to his control over the policy agenda. Three of the five 
Commissioners interviewed for that project characterised Barroso I as presidential rather than 
collegial. Giving their answers to the online survey distributed to policy officers and members 
of cabinet in 2008 as part of ‘The European Commission in Question’, respondents rated Bar-
roso as strong on ‘setting a policy agenda’ and ‘managing the house’. These views were ex-
pressed especially strongly by cabinet members and senior managers. In interviews, senior 
managers in particular testified that Barroso closely controlled the policy agenda at all levels 
of the policy process. Cabinet members highlighted how in meetings of ‘special chefs’, the 
President’s chef de cabinet had shaped, delayed or effectively vetoed policy proposals. They 
noted that Barroso kept a much tighter rein on the Commission’s policy programme than his 
immediate predecessors (see Kassim et al. 2013: ch 6).  
It would be surprising if such a dramatic reorientation had been welcomed positively 
by staff. Most theoretical perspectives on bureaucratic change, including sociological institu-
tionalism and historical institutionalism - public choice accounts are an exception - suggest 
that bureaucrats are conservative and wary about, if not hostile, to administrative reform 
(Kassim 2008). In the case of the Commission, concentration of power in the hands of the 
President was at odds with the principle and the practice of collegiality (Dimitrakopoulos 
2008) and the assertion of presidential control over policy was likely to offend not only other 
members of the College, but Directors General who had been powerful and important policy-
making figures (Coombes 1970; Kassim et al. 2016). Coming immediately after the Kinnock 
reforms, which had sought to give the Commission a stronger organizational steering capacity 
and to strengthen management, but on which staff were divided (Kassim 2008; Kassim et al. 
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2003: ch 8), the presidentialisation of policy-making authority was likely to be interpreted as a 
further step away from the Commission’s traditional mission. 
Evidence from ‘The European Commission in Question’ shows that there was indeed 
strong ambivalence among Commission staff about both presidentialisation and the emer-
gence of a more interventionist Secretariat General that had accompanied it (Kassim et al. 
2013: chs 6, 7). They were also divided on whether coordination from the centre was a good 
thing and on the new emphasis on management. Although recognizing that the introduction of 
processes such as SPP had been intended to make the overall administration more systematic, 
effective and accountable, many doubted its effectiveness and value. Moreover, for many of-
ficials, ‘managerialism’ ran counter to the Commission’s culture, which prized policy formu-
lation far above policy management and implementation. Although 49 per cent of respondents 
to the online survey administered as part of the ‘European Commission in Question’ agreed or 
strongly agreed with the proposition that ‘The Commission is increasingly more involved in 
policy management and coordination, and less in policy conception or initiation’, there was 
little evidence that there had been an accompanying change in the Commission’s administra-
tive culture. In the same survey fully 79 per cent of respondents disagreed with the proposi-
tion, ‘The Commission should focus primarily on managing existing policies rather than de-
veloping new ones’. The 38 per cent who merely disagreed were outnumbered – albeit mar-
ginally – by the 41 per cent who strongly disagreed. 
 
Legislative Activity 
The institutional and organizational transformations of the Commission preceding the crisis 
are clearly reflected in its output of the time. In line with his ambitions, Barroso succeeded in 
shifting the Commission towards a more programmatic, disciplined and sensitive approach. It 
has not become less active but more and more diversified in the use of legislative instruments 
and increasingly opting for less intrusive measures. Analysis of data from EUR-Lex reveals 
that the EU executive reduced the number of hard law proposals after a peak of legislative 
activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see also Kurpas et al. 2008). In 2009, on the eve of 
the crisis, the Commission issued proposals for 145 regulations and 30 directives. Exactly 20 
years earlier, it proposed 418 regulations and 133 directives. The numbers thus dropped by 65 
per cent and 77 per cent respectively. During the same period, the number of decision pro-
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posals increased by 88 per cent, from 140 to 263. This attenuates the overall decrease in hard 
law proposals, but it still amounts to 37 per cent.  
At the same time, the Commission produced an increasing amount of soft law. In 
1989, communications and reports added up to a total of 100; in 2009, there were already 360 
such documents. The ratio of hard law to these forms of soft law thus changed from 1/0.16 to 
1/0.82. Annual numbers are subject to some fluctuation, but a comparison of averages of pre-
paratory acts in five-year intervals from 1985 to 2009, broadly representing Commission 
terms, yields similar results (Table 1). The overall output thus remained fairly constant over 
the years, but its composition changed considerably. 
 
TABLE 1 
ANNUAL AVERAGE OF COMMISSION PREPARATORY ACTS BY TYPE IN FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS 
 
Regulations Directives Decisions Communications Reports Total 
1985-1989 456 106 106 58 67 793 
1990-1994 392 122 140 54 56 764 
1995-1999 262 103 201 104 115 785 
2000-2004 227 82 238 167 115 829 
2005-2009 190 69 211 231 120 821 
Notes: Rounded numbers. 
Source: EUR-Lex. Search query: Preparatory acts, date of document, excludes corrigenda. 
 
There have also been significant shifts between policy fields.3 These can again be illustrated 
by comparing the numbers for 1989 and 2009. Agriculture and fisheries, previously hot spots 
of Commission activity, have witnessed a decrease of roughly two-thirds in preparatory acts, 
from 301 to 91. The progress in the integration of the single market led to an over 90 per cent 
drop in the field of customs, from 112 to 19. The most significant increase in output is related 
to the gradual integration of justice and home affairs in the new millennium. Previously not a 
concern for EU action, the Commission issued 82 preparatory acts in this field in 2009. The 
field of environment, customers and health has also experienced strong growth. Respective 
Commission output more than doubled, arriving at over 100 preparatory acts per year shortly 
before the crisis. Furthermore, outputs in general, financial and institutional matters as well as 
in economic and monetary policy, starting with minimal Commission activity, more than tri-
pled, arriving at 59 and 45 preparatory acts respectively. Finally, a moderate increase of 20 
per cent can be observed in the field of external relations, i.e., common commercial policy 
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and bilateral agreements. By 2009, the Commission therefore proved to be an institution with 
a broad sphere of action. This diversity can also be interpreted as a lack of focus: of all inter-
nal policy fields, not a single one accounted for more than 10 per cent of all preparatory acts.  
In sum, on the eve of the crisis the Commission was already in a process of transfor-
mation. Institutionally, the Lisbon Treaty had increased the powers of the European Council 
and the European Parliament, while politically the Commission faced an increasingly scepti-
cal climate. The response of the Commission under Barroso’s first term had been to enact a 
major departure from previous practice. Building on the expanded formal prerogatives to fur-
ther strengthen the office, Barroso used the political, procedural and administrative resources 
of the Commission Presidency to take a more disciplined, limited and sensitive approach to 
policy-making. In particular, there was a marked shift from hard to soft legislation. A substan-
tial focus had, however, not yet materialized.  
 
The Commission and the Crisis 
When the Eurozone crisis unfolded in 2010, it threw the EU into political and institutional 
turmoil. In regard to the Commission, however, the crisis mainly served as a catalyst that rein-
forced trends in its institutional and political environment, internal organization and legisla-
tive activity.  
 
Institutional and Political Environment 
In line with its new status accorded by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council emerged as 
the main venue for debating how the EU should respond to the Eurozone crisis (Puetter 2012). 
Although it has no legislative function under Article 15 TEU, in what might be interpreted as 
a deliberate move to pre-empt discussions of strong supranational solutions, the European 
Council not only defined the broad strokes of the crisis response but also put forward policy 
details. As Fabbrini (2013: 1011) argues, at the onset of the crisis ‘the EU intergovernmental 
constitution enjoyed the support of a powerful constellation of political leaders and public 
opinions’. Indeed, important national leaders, such as Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, 
quickly made it known that they preferred intergovernmental decision-making and outcomes 
to supranational alternatives, which included empowerments of the Commission (see also 
Dehousse 2015). This sentiment also corresponded with public opinion. Trust in the Commis-
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sion among EU citizens dropped by ten percentage points in the first two years of the crisis, 
from 46 per cent trusting the institution in the fall 2009 to 36 per cent in the fall 2011 (Com-
mission 2013: 50-70). Talks of a new ‘Union method’ as an alternative to the ‘Community 
method’, Commission proposals that went nowhere, such as the Eurobonds (Hodson 2013), 
and the first institutional outcomes – i.e., lending facilities outside the EU’s legal system – all 
highlight the intergovernmental character of early crisis management. 
However, the institutional responses to the crisis have actually strengthened the Com-
mission (Bauer and Becker 2014).4 The Commission’s involvement in economic policy sur-
veillance is now broader and deeper. As a result of the ‘six-pack’ legislation, the Commission 
became responsible for monitoring the overall public debt and developments in national ex-
penditure. Its assessments and recommendations also carry additional weight due to ‘reversed 
qualified majority’ voting for fines and sanctions. The Commission is also responsible for 
managing the new Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, in which it is able to conduct quan-
titative and qualitative analyses of national trade balances. Under the ‘two-pack’ legislation, 
the Commission is further entrusted with assessing – in an advisory capacity – the conformity 
of draft national budgets with EU rules, while as part of the intergovernmental Fiscal Com-
pact, aimed at further strengthening fiscal discipline and intensifying surveillance, the Com-
mission has a role in developing policy principles and monitoring compliance.  
The coordination procedures for national policies in areas of common interest, includ-
ing social security and employment, have also been upgraded during the crisis. Both the Eu-
rope 2020 process, the successor of the Lisbon Strategy, and the Euro Plus Pact, which was 
adopted in 2011 by the Eurozone members and six other states to promote competitiveness, 
employment and sustainable public debt, have broadened the Commission’s responsibilities. 
Its role is to gather and synthesise information and recommend paths of action. Finally, even 
the intergovernmental arrangements in the field of financial stability support involve the 
Commission in a number of capacities. Along with the European Central Bank, the Commis-
sion assesses the financing needs of applicants and subsequently proposes decisions on grant-
ing assistance. As part of the troika, which also features the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, the Commission then negotiates conditionality agreements and 
monitors compliance afterwards.  
The crisis has thus reinforced, at least in economic governance, the Commission’s 
shift from policy entrepreneurship to management. Rather than weakening its position, how-
ever, this has strengthened the Commission, as the delegated tasks are not purely administra-
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tive matters. On the contrary, these coordination, negotiation and monitoring duties come with 
some discretion in highly political matters. The crisis and its institutional outcomes have 
therefore created new opportunities for the Commission to influence policy-making in the EU, 
even if they are less obvious than the classic entrepreneurship through hard law proposals. 
 
Internal Organization 
The crisis served to reinforce presidential leadership, first under Barroso II and second with 
the election of Jean-Claude Juncker. At the outset of his second term in 2010, which followed 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the preceding year, Barroso reinforced the Commis-
sion President’s leadership role. Symbolising his pursuit of his aim of a more programmatic 
approach to policy, Barroso introduced a State of Union speech, to be given by the Commis-
sion President each September – the first was delivered in 2010 – that would set the main pol-
icy priorities not only of the Commission, but of the EU more generally, for the coming year. 
The speech would inform the policy agenda set out in the Commission’s annual work pro-
gramme. Moreover, Barroso took the decision that in the prevailing climate of austerity the 
Commission should focus its attention on crisis-related areas of policy only. Intervention in 
other areas would be seen as an unnecessary distraction. In the words of a senior manager in 
the Secretariat General: ‘the legislative activity of the Commission was put on the backburner 
or in the freezer for a while’.5 
Evidence from ‘European Commission: Facing the Future’ attests to the presidential-
ism of Barroso II. When asked their opinion on the propositions, ‘Some people argue that the 
College under the current President is a presidential body; others that it is collegial’, all eight 
members of the Commission in the sample expressed the view that the Commission was pres-
idential. There was also consensus among the eight that College discussion was limited. Simi-
larly, in face-to-face interviews conducted in 2014, 75 per cent of managers (total n=110), 80 
per cent of Directors General (total n=18) and 92 per cent of cabinet members (total n=17) 
characterized the Barroso Commission as ‘more presidential’ rather than ‘more collegial’. 
 When he succeeded Barroso, Juncker further reinforced presidentialization. The 
Spitzenkandidaten process by which he was elected Commission President gave Juncker a 
unique claim to personal authority (Christiansen 2016). Having won the EPP’s primary con-
test, he became the party’s official candidate in the 2014 elections to the European Parlia-
ment. Then, following his nomination by the European Council and his election by a majority 
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of MEPs in the new Parliament, Juncker could claim that he had a mandate to put into effect 
the policy programme on which he had campaigned. That platform identified a number of 
policy priorities, but Juncker also argued that in the post-crisis climate the Commission ur-
gently needed to deliver. It was in this context that as nominee Commission President Juncker 
spoke of the ‘last chance Commission’. 
 The radical restructuring of the College undertaken by Juncker was designed not only 
to institutionalize the pre-eminence of the Commission President, but to address a number of 
weaknesses, old and new, in the Commission.6 A first aim was to ensure that Commissioners 
were collectively mobilised behind the implementation of his policy programme. Departing 
from tradition, Juncker looked to recruit seven Vice Presidents. A largely honorary title in 
previous Commissions,7 Juncker wanted Vice Presidents to play a ‘hands on’ role either in 
coordinating designated policy groups of portfolio Commissioners or managing institution-
wide functions. The creation of a tier of Vice Presidents, subject to the authority of the Com-
mission President, was a strategy intended to establish shared leadership and responsibility to 
‘ensure a dynamic interaction of all Members of the College’ (Commission 2014b).  
Second, a complaint of the leadership during the Barroso era, particularly in the sec-
ond term, had been that individual Commissioners often ‘went missing’ at moments of stress.8 
Appointing senior politicians – former Prime Ministers, deputy Prime Ministers, and Foreign 
or Finance Ministers – to the position of Vice President was intended ensure that political 
responsibility could spread among a team of experienced individuals, used to dealing with the 
media. Third, the restructuring was intended to ensure implementation of the Commission’s 
policy programme. Juncker had made clear that only policy proposals relating to his ‘ten pri-
orities’ would be adopted. Allowing Vice Presidents alone the right to submit agenda items 
for discussion at meetings of the College created a mechanism for policing this rule.  
A final aim of the new structure was to give the Commission the powerful political 
leadership it had lacked for much of its history and especially to overcome its administrative 
fragmentation. In addition to the lack of shared purpose among Commissioners (Coombes 
1970), the asymmetry between career politicians and permanent civil servants had been par-
ticularly sharp in the Commission’s case. The new organization of the College was intended 
to prevent ‘divide and rule’ strategies on the part of Director Generals and to ensure that, 
faced by a united political leadership, ‘[t]he directors-general, all highly competent, have to 
obey their Commissioners and not the other way round’ (Juncker 2014). As Juncker ex-
plained: ‘They will work together in a spirit of collegiality and mutual dependence. I want to 
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overcome silo-mentalities and introduce a new collaborative way of working in areas where 
Europe can really make a difference’ (Commission 2014b). 
This new model was radical, because it appeared to depart from the convention that all 
Commissioners are equal. However, Juncker denied this was the case: ‘In the new Commis-
sion, there are no first or second-class Commissioners – there are team leaders and team play-
ers.’ Second, although groups of Commissioners were nothing new – Hallstein had used them 
in the first College, as had Prodi and Barroso in the more recent past – the idea of flexible, 
fluid and overlapping teams was an innovation. Third, it raised issues of command and ac-
countability. Since Vice Presidents would not be responsible for particular services, the new 
structure appeared to break the link between the Commissioner and his or her department. 
Interviews conducted with senior officeholders in the Juncker Commission emphasize the top-
down character of decision making, which is even more personal and presidential than under 
Barroso. Proposals are rigorously screened first by the Vice Presidents, then by First Vice 
President Timmermans, and the catalogue, to which items not on the Commission work pro-
gram were added, has been all but abolished. In reporting on its first hundred days, the Junck-
er Commission proudly plotted Commission actions in terms of the implementation of the 
President’s ten priorities.  
 
Legislative Activity 
The crisis years brought further shifts in legislative activity by the Commission. Existing 
trends continued and partly accelerated. Overall, the output of the Commission fell during 
Barroso II, even compared to Barroso I. However, the reduction was only indirectly due to the 
crisis and more an effect of the mechanisms introduced to increase the Commission Presi-
dent’s control over policy-making. The role played by the Secretariat General and procedures 
such as impact assessment and the advance notice required by SPP to allow entry to the 
Commission work programme were effective in the development of a more programmatic 
approach and to dampening policy activism.   
The pattern of sectoral differentiation between 2010 and 2014, however, reflects the 
decision of Commission President Barroso to focus on crisis-related areas. Economic govern-
ance is front and centre. Excluding external relations, the plurality of preparatory acts (70) 
issued by the Commission in 2014 was in the field of ‘Economic and Monetary Policy and 
Free Movement of Capital’. In the three years before the crisis, from 2007-2009, this category 
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only ranked tenth in the list of the most lively internal policy fields. Much of this increase can 
be attributed to the Commission’s strengthened role in the European Semester, in particular 
the reinforced surveillance of macroeconomic policy and the new standing of country-specific 
recommendations since 2012. But even before, the Commission proved quite active in this 
field, especially in administering balance-of-payments assistance to Hungary, Latvia and Ro-
mania. It comes as no surprise then that in the period from 2010 to 2014, ‘Economic and 
Monetary policy and Free Movement of Capital’ was the fourth most dynamic field of Com-
mission activity, being closely behind ‘General, Financial and Institutional Matters’, ‘Indus-
trial Policy and Internal Market’ and ‘Environment, Consumers and Health Protection’ (see 
Table 2). In comparison with the immediate pre-crisis years, it not only surpassed the declin-
ing output in agriculture and fisheries, but also the most upcoming field in the first decade of 
the new millennium, that is justice and home affairs. 
 
TABLE 2 
COMMISSION PREPARATORY ACTS IN TEN MOST ACTIVE INTERNAL POLICY FIELDS 2010-2014 
Policy field 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
2010-
2014 
Total 
2005-
2009 
Change 
in per cent 
General, Financial and Institutional Matters 126 
 
100 
 
51 
 
73 
 
55 
 
405 384 +5 
Environment, Consumers and Health Protection 90 
 
88 
 
75 
 
83 
 
43 
 
379 538 -30 
Industrial Policy and Internal Market 88 
 
106 
 
65 
 
52 
 
46 
 
357 527 -32 
Economic and Monetary Policy, Free Movement of Capital 77 
 
41 
 
71 
 
94 
 
70 
 
353 181 +95 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 61 
 
77 
 
52 
 
66 
 
54 
 
310 323 -4 
Freedom of Movement for Workers and Social Policy 64 
 
58 
 
50 
 
39 
 
42 
 
253 239 +6 
Fisheries 42 
 
42 
 
47 
 
38 
 
45 
 
214 203 +5 
Transport 29 
 
40 
 
37 
 
52 
 
49 
 
207 298 -31 
Agriculture 58 
 
46 
 
32 
 
38 
 
24 
 
198 340 -42 
Taxation 20 
 
24 
 
29 
 
30 
 
21 
 
124 135 -8 
Notes: Percentages rounded. Categories according to directory code. 
Source: EUR-Lex. Search query: preparatory acts, date of document, excludes corrigenda. 
 
Furthermore, these numbers only include the Commission’s role in financial stability support 
only in regard to supranational lending facilities, i.e., the balance-of-payments assistance and 
the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism. The important roles it plays in the intergov-
ernmental facilities (the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability 
Mechanism) – analysing financing needs, negotiating memoranda of understanding and moni-
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toring implementation – are not represented in this data. For the second Greek bailout alone 
the Commission produced, in liaison with the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, twelve informal documents, including four 300-page reviews. The actual 
increase of Commission activity in economic governance is therefore even higher. And it was 
not stopped by the incoming President Juncker’s strategy of legislative self-restraint. While 
this decision applied to all policy fields, economic governance was among the least affected. 
In fact, roughly half of the 23 new initiatives in the Commission work programme for 2015 
were more or less explicitly economic policy issues (European Commission 2015).  
This quantitative expansion is accompanied by qualitative assertiveness. Respective 
evidence can be found in different areas of economic governance. As regards general institu-
tional development, Copeland and James (2014: 12) provide an account of how the outbreak 
of the crisis has enabled the Commission ‘to secure agreement on an important series of re-
forms which established a new governance architecture of economic surveillance’ when steer-
ing the discussion on the reform of the Europe 2020 strategy. As was shown earlier, the 
Commission gained significant competences, when this governance architecture later materi-
alized. It then quickly emerged that, in practice, the Commission followed a clear mission 
when using its discretion in rule application, showing significant lenience towards member 
states struggling to meet the new criteria. As Schmidt (2016: XX) argues, the Commission 
proved ‘flexible and accommodating, given that [the member states] were encouraged to find 
ways to ameliorate their balance sheets while avoiding pro-cyclical measures’. Belgium, 
France and Italy were the states that most openly benefited from this approach. While the 
member states are ultimately decisive in these proceedings, it is obvious that the Commission 
recommendations effectively steer the decision-making phase. In 2015, the incoming Juncker 
Commission underlined its willingness to further pursue the applied flexibility by issuing a 
communication (COM/2015/012) on the application of the existing rules in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. It set out to re-interpret exceptions for states implementing structural reforms. 
This document and the preceding lenience clearly run counter the preferences of many mem-
ber states, especially Germany, that preferred stricter adherence to the new rules. Indeed, this 
development represented ‘one of the remarkable aspects of changes introduced in the eco-
nomic governance of the EU in the wake of the economic and financial crisis’ (Dehousse 
2015: 2).  
Further evidence for Commission assertiveness can be found in its exercise of coordi-
nation functions. Schmidt (2016) shows how the Commission slowly changed the direction of 
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policy coordination in the Europe 2020 strategy from strictly economic – i.e., subordinating 
every policy field to fiscal consolidation – to a broader, increasingly social agenda. More 
broadly, the Commission has used the reformed architecture of the European Semester to bol-
ster the effect of country-specific recommendations, which are in principle not binding, by 
symbolically coupling them with its monitoring results in macroeconomic surveillance. In 
managing the field of financial stability support, it also turned towards more social and 
growth-friendly policies. Again, the incoming Juncker Commission intensified these efforts. 
Juncker’s efforts in brokering a deal for a third Greek bailout in the spring of 2015 incensed 
the German and like-minded governments. His ostensible sympathy for Greek demands led 
the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, to publicly reflect on curtailing the powers 
of the Commission by separating its political leadership from some administrative functions 
(Mussler 2015). These examples show that the Commission is both willing and able to influ-
ence EU policy-making in economic governance. To this end, it is not any longer fully de-
pendent hard law proposals, but increasingly competent to pursue its agenda through the vari-
ous management functions it has gathered during the crisis. By linking its outputs in the vari-
ous monitoring and coordination procedures, it can provide quite some impetus in economic 
governance.  
 
Conclusion: A new kind of engine?  
Although the Eurozone crisis severely tested the Commission, it was only the latest challenge 
for an institution that has been embattled since the Maastricht Treaty and arguably before. The 
Commission has been repeatedly challenged by empowered institutions, i.e., the European 
Council and the European Parliament, and since the 1990s has been constrained by a political 
climate that has been increasingly hostile to action on the part of ‘Brussels’. Yet the crisis did 
not change the Commission. Rather, it acted as a catalyst for a process of transformation that 
was already underway. On taking office in 2004, Barroso argued for a more presidential 
Commission that would take a more measured, strategic and responsive approach to policy. 
The crisis strengthened his hand, leading him to limit Commission action to those areas of 
policy that required urgent action – economic and monetary policy, financial services, compe-
tition policy, and trade. 
 Although the Commission is under pressure, it is not facing general decline. Rather, its 
approach and outlook has changed. A new more restrained model has emerged, with the ex-
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pansionist and interventionist ways of the past firmly set aside. Policy entrepreneurship in the 
classic sense – i.e., formulating and pushing for hard law – may be increasingly difficult in the 
current EU, but the Commission can succeed if its efforts are strategic and focused. Moreover, 
its array of management duties ensures that it is able to exert influence on EU action in less 
intrusive ways. At the same time, the crisis accelerated the process of presidentialisation with-
in the Commission, leaving the President with new powers and resources to take personal 
control over the policy agenda. In combination, increased management responsibilities and 
strong presidentialism allowed the Commission to be assertive in the crisis context. The les-
son from the crisis years is therefore that, at least in economic governance, the Commission is 
still able to act as an engine of integration; yet it is an engine increasingly different from the 
traditional understanding. 
 It remains to be seen whether this transformation will take the same form and have the 
same effect in other areas. As the Commission’s competences vary across policy areas, differ-
ent sectoral modes of entrepreneurialism may emerge. Given the trend of presidentialisation, 
and along with it prioritisation, some policy areas will receive even less attention in the near 
future – a tendency evident in interviews with some outgoing Commissioners in 2014, who 
expressed disappointment that items from their portfolios rarely featured on the Commission’s 
agenda. The Commission will not be able or willing to advance integration in all fields at all 
times or at the same pace.  
Yet, although the Commission has been remodelled, it is not clear that it has been ‘re-
cast’ ‘in a new mould’ (Bickerton et al. 2015b: 39) as suggested by the new intergovernmen-
talism. The argument that it is by now more circumspect about pursuing an ever closer union 
cannot be dismissed. Neither can the claim that supranational institutions act strategically de-
pending on the level of support in the political environment. But the assertion that the Com-
mission has abandoned any pretentions to leadership or any policy ambitions appears to be 
unwarranted. Not only has the Commission emerged from the Eurozone crisis with expanded 
management functions, as Puetter (2015) has acknowledged, which it can and does use to 
provide less intrusive impetus for policy-making; classic Commission policy entrepreneurship 
also remains, as initiatives in the area of economic governance and beyond (financial services, 
energy, the environment and migration) make clear.  
 The changing institutional balance since the Lisbon Treaty and the Eurozone crisis, in 
particular in the field of leadership, may go beyond the traditional dichotomy of integration 
theory. Crespy and Menz (2015: 765) have, for instance, argued that a ‘new hybrid form of 
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governance drawing from both political intergovernmentalism and technocratic supranational-
ism’ has emerged in the wake of the latter. The role of the Commission appears to be a prime 
example. Far-reaching entrepreneurship has diminished to a large extent but many of the new 
technical duties in budgetary and macroeconomic monitoring, have a strong political compo-
nent, with leadership implications. The Commission has also shown historically that it can act 
as a ‘purposeful opportunist’ (Cram 1994: 214), employing various techniques beyond the 
proposal of hard law to eventually further integration. Now that it is more hierarchical in its 
internal organization, the strategic use of different methods to realize this goal is even more 
feasible. The Commission’s role as an engine of integration will therefore endure, but in a 
different guise.  
  
 
 
 
Notes 
1 The surveys and interviews were conducted as part of two research projects. The first project (‘The European 
Commission in Question’, 2008-2009) comprised an online survey in the Commission (n=1901) and interviews 
with Commissioners (n=5), cabinet members (28) and managers (n=119). It was led by Hussein Kassim (PI) and 
John Peterson, involved Michael W. Bauer, Sara Connolly, Renaud Dehousse, and Liesbet Hooghe, and was 
funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. RES-062-23-1188). For more information, 
see http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ. The findings are presented in Kassim et al. 2013. The second 
project (‘European Commission: Facing the Future’, 2014) included an online survey (n=5,545) and interviews 
with Commissioners (n=9), cabinet members (n=25), and managers (n=120), conducted between March and 
September 2014. The project was led by Kassim and Connolly, the research team included Michael W. Bauer, 
Renaud Dehousse, and Andrew Thompson. 
2 There are ‘indirect’ rights of initiative for the Parliament (Art. 225 TFEU), the Council (Art. 241 TFEU) and 
even the citizens via the European Citizens Initiative (Art. 11(4) TEU), who all can ‘invite’ the Commission to 
submit a legislative proposal. The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the Parliament’s indirect right by codifying the 
obligation of the Commission to give reasons when not submitting a proposal following an invitation. 
3 Some of these differences reflect cross-sectoral variation in the development of the acquis communautaire. In 
some areas, the regulatory regime was already mature. In others, EU legislative action was newer or had been 
less extensive.  
4 There is some debate to what extent the Commission can generally be considered a winner of the Eurocrisis (da 
Conceição-Heldt 2016; Bauer and Becker 2016); however, there is agreement that in the field of macroeconomic 
and budgetary surveillance, this verdict does hold true. 
5 Interview conducted by Hussein Kassim and Renaud Dehousse, Brussels, 6 May 2015. 
6 Interview with cabinet member of Commission President Juncker, conducted by Hussein Kassim, 18 June 2015 
7 There are important exceptions. One example is Neil Kinnock, who led administrative reform in the Prodi 
Commission. 
8 Interview with cabinet member of former Commission President Barroso, conducted by Sara Connolly and 
Hussein Kassim, 5 May 2015. 
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